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[L. A. No. 25060. In Bank.

Oct. 24,1958.]

CARL F. W. BORGWARD, G.Y.B.H. (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES
COUNTY, Respondent; A. W. WOOLVERTON et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
[1] Corporations-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Under
Code Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2, authorizing service of process
on foreign corporations that are doing business in this state,
"doing business" is a descriptive term that the courts have
equated with such minimum contacts with the state that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.
[2] Id. - Foreign Oorporations - Doing Business.-"Doing business" within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 411, is synon-

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Foreign Corporations, § 34 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Foreign Corporations, § 360 et seq.
iricK. Dig. References: [1-7] Corporations, § 898; [8] Corporations, § 899.
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ymous with the power of the st,ate to subject foreign eorporations to loeal process.
Id. - Foreigu Corpofll.tiono
Dom, Dusincli8. - The words
"transad intrastate business," LIS defined in Corp. Code, § 6203,
are not the equivalent of "doing business in this State," as
used in Code Civ. Proe., § 411, subd. 2.
ld. - Foreign Corporations - Doing Business. - Corp. Code.
§ 6203, by excluding acts done by a foreign corporation in this
state in interstate or foreign commerce from its definition of
"transact intrastate business," clearly recogniled that a ,e6rporation may do business in this state without transacting
intrastate business.
ld. - Foreign Oorporations - Doing Business. - Corp. Code,
§ 6300, declaring that "this part (part 11, relating to foreign
corporations) does not apply to corporations engaged solely
in interstate or foreign commerce," affords no basis for departing from the well established meaning of "doing business
in this State/' as used in Code Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2, since
the service provisions of part 11 (Corp. Code, §§ 6500-6504)
are applieable to such foreign corporations, not 6a: proprio
'Vigore, but because they are incorporated by reference in Code
Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2.
ld.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Part 11 of the
Corporations Code, in addition to the service provisions
(§§ 6500-6504), eontains detailed regulatory and penal provisions governing foreign corporations engaged in the transaction of intrastate business, and the legislative history of § 6300
makes clear that it was these latter provisions, not Code Civ.
Proe., § 411, subd. 2, that are gov:erned by it.
ld. - Foreign Oorporations - Doing Business.-Former 'Civ.
Code, § 407 (now substantially Corp. Code, § 6300), referred
only to the acts required to qualify to conduct intrastate business and made clear thnt foreign corporations engaged solely
in interstate or foreign commerce were not required so to qualify, but in no way indicated that such corporations doing
business in this state were not subject to service here.
ld.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-A German corporation whose products were not only sold in this state
through an independent importer who purchased and took title
to its products in Germany, but which actively undertook to
promote and protect its market in California by sending its
agent to negotiate contracts here and who has performed such
important services for such corporation here, namely, the establishment and maintenance of a satisfactory importing, distributing and sales organization, as to constitute such agent the
corporation's "general manager in this State" (Corp. Code,
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§ 6500) for purposes of service of process, and process 'Was
properly served.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court I
of Los Angeles County to enter an order quashing service of
summons upon petitioner. Writ denied.
Overton, Lyman & Prince, Eugene Overton and Ernest E.
Johnson for Petitioner.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and William E.
Lamoreaux, Assistant County CounsE'l, for Respondent.
Macbeth & Ford and Moira Ford for Real Parties in
Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, Carl F. W. Borgward G. M.
B. H., a German corporation, seeks a writ of mandate to
compel the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to enter
its order quashing service of summons in an action brought by
plaintiffs, the real parties in interest in this proceeding. (See
Code Civ. Proc. § 416.3.) Earle C. Anthony, Inc., and Doe
One to Doe Ten were joined as defendants in plaintiffs'
action. Borgward was served by makiligpersonal service on
Lutz Knemeyer in California as its alleged "general manager
in this State." (Corp. Code, § 6500.) It appeared specially
and moved to quash the service of summons. Its motion was
denied.
At the time they filed their action, plaintiffs were distributors and dealers selling Borgward automobiles and pa
pursuant to a contract with Anthony, the exclusive importe
of Borgward's products for the western United States. An
thony had announced its intention not to renew plaintiffs
contract at the end of its term on December 31, 1957. Plain
tiffs alleged that Anthony had agreed that the contract woul
be renewed unless plaintiffs gave Anthony good cause fo
refusing to do so, but that the contract failed to express thi~
agreement. They also alleged an oral contract with Borgwal'~
whereby plaintiffs agreed to enter into a franclliRe agreemE'llf
with Anthony for distributing Borgward products and B01'g!
ward agreed that plaintiffs' franchise to market such product~;
in the territory already developed in Southern Californi
would not be terminated so long as plaintiffs performed thei
duties diligently and efficiently, and that Anthony's contrac'
with Borgward was subject to this oral agreement.
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Plaintiffs also alleged that Anthony and Doe One to Doe Ten
{'ntf'rl'n 8 (>onspira(>y to interfere with their oral contract with
Borgward for the purpose of appropriating plaintiffs' business for themselves.
Plaintiffs prayed for reformation of their contract with
Anthony and a declaration of their rights thereunder; for a
declaration of the existence and terms of their oral agreement
with Borgward; for injunctive relief against Anthony and
Borgward to secure plaintiffs' rights under their contracts;
and for compensatory and exemplary damages against Anthony and Doe One to Doe Ten.
Borgward contends that it was not and is not doing business
in this state within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure,
!'ection 411, subdivision 2, and is therefore not subject to
service of process pursuant to Corporations Code, section 6500.
[1] In Henry R. John & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
2d 855, 858-859 [323 P.2d 437], we stated: "The statute
authorizes service of process on foreign corporations that are
'doing business in this State.' That term is a descriptive one
that the courts have equated with such minimum contacts with
the state 'that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
(IntenwHono.l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 [66
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057].) Whatever limitntion it imposes is equivalent to that of the due process clause.
[2] ." [D]oing business" within the meaning of section 411
of the Code of Civil Procedure is synonymous with the power
of the state to subject foreign corporations to local process.' (Eclipse FtleZ etc. Co. v. S1(.perior Court, 148 Cal.App.
2d 736, 738 [307 P.2d 739] . . . . )"
It is contended at the outset that we should reexamine the
rule of the Jahn case in the light of Corporations Code,
sr('tions 6203 and 6300. Code of Civil Procedure section 411,
suhdivision 2, provides for service of process on foreign cor]10ration8 "doing business in this State; in the manner provided by Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporations
Code." Those sections and sections 6203 and 6300 are all in
part 11 of the Corporations Code. Section 6300 provides that
., this part does not apply to corporations engagf'd solely
in intrrs!atf' or fOl'('ign eOll1mercr," awl I;('('! ion 620~ provi(l<,s
1llat ""l'rallsad intl'astat(> IJllsilll'ss' Dlrllll.-'; I'llfprilig into
J'\'p<,ated and sueeessive transactions of its busilless in tIlis
Stair, other than intl'rstate or foreign commerce." Accord-
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ingly, it is contended that no provision has been made for
service on corporations engaged solely in interstate or foreign
commerce and that "doing business in this State" wllhill
the meaning of section 411 must mean transacting intrastate
business as defined in section 6203.
There is no merit in this contention. [3] Section 6203
defines, not the words "doing business in this State," but
the words "transact intrastate business." Since the Legislature was dealing specifically with the definition of terms, had
it meant the two phrases to be equivalent, it would have said
so. [4] Moreover, by excluding acts done by a foreign
corporation in this state in interstate or foreign commerce
from its definition of the words "transact intrastate business,"
it clearly recognized that a corporation may do business in
this state without transacting intrastate business.
[6] Nor does section 6300 afford any basis for departing
from the well established meaning of "doing business in this
State," which was followed and applied in the Jahn case.
It is true that if the service provisions of part 11 of the
Corporations Code stood alone, section 6300 ,vould prevent
their application to corporations engaged solely in interstate
or foreign commerce. Those provisions are applicable to such
corporations, however, not ex proprio vigore, but because they
are incorporated by reference in section 411, subdivision 2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. To hold that section 6300
governs section 411, subdivision 2, would require amending it
to read "This part and section 411, subdivision 2 of the Code
of Civil Procedure do not apply to corporations engaged solely
in interstate or foreign commerce."
[6] In addition to the service provisions, part 11 of the
Corporations Code contains detailed regulatory and penal provisions governing foreign corporations engaged in the transaction of intrastate business, and the legislative history of
section 6300 makes clear that it was these latter provisions, not
section 411, subdivision 2, that are governed by it. [7] Section 6300 was based on former Civil Code, section 407, which
provided that "The requirements of this chapter [now part
11 of the Corporations Code] as to foreign corporations shall
not apply to corporations engaged solely in interstate or
foreign commerce." (Italics added.) Section 407 thus referred only to the acts required to qualify to conduct intrastate business and made clear that foreign corporations engaged solely in interstate or foreign commerce were not
required so to qualify. It is no way indicated, however, that

)
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such corporations doing business in this state were not subject
to service of process here. Given this court's recognition in
1942 that a fOTficn ~oTpoTat.ion fngRg'f'il lIolfly in intfTlltl\tf'
commerce may be amenable to suit here (West Publishing 00.
v. Superior Oourt, 20 Ca1.2d 720, 729-731 [128 P.2d 777]),
and the legislative declaration when the Corporations Code
was enacted in 1947 that the" provisions of this code, insofar
as they are substantially the same as existing statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter, shall be construed
as restatements and continuations, and not as new enactments" (Corp. Code, § 2), the recasting of the wording of
section 407 of the Civil Code in section 6300 of the Corporations Code cannot be interpreted as intended to effect a
radical change in the jurisdiction provided over foreign corporations by section 411, subdivision 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
[8] Borgward contends, however, that even under the
tests enunciated in the J ahn case and the cases there cited,
it is not doing business in this state. Although it appears that
several million dollars worth of its products are sold in this
state annually, Borgward contends that such business is solely
that of its independent importer Anthony, who purchases
and takes title to its products in Germany. (See Irvine 00. v.
McOolgan, 26 Ca1.2d 160, 165-166 [157 P.2d 847, 167 A.L.R.
934].) Plaintiffs do not seek to found jurisdiction on the fact
alone, however, that Borgward's products are sold in this state
through Anthony, but on that fact coupled with the acts donc
in this state by Borgward's agent Knemeyer in negotiating
and arranging for the distribution of Borgward products by
independent contractors, and they point out that their alleged
cause of action is directly related to Knemeyer's activities
here.
Knemeyer visited California for periods of several days on
three occasions in 1956 and 1957. In February 1956, with
the approval of Borgward, he executed a contract in the
form of a letter from Thomson to Borgward in Los Angeles
appointing Walter J. Thomson CompanY,Ltd., as exclusive
importer. It described Knemeyer's activities as follows:
"1. The territory which you originally granted to us as
sole importers had been broadened by Mr. Knemeyer to include
all of the trading area territory lying west of the Mississippi
River.
"2. Mr. Knemeyer has removed Bob Knapp as distributor

)
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for California and has approved the appointment of Bob
Knapp as exclusive dealer for the City of Pasadena ....
"3. Mr. Knemeyer has approved the appointment of
Messrs. Ed. Van Horn and Gordon Reid (who are forming a
new corporation) as distributors for Northern California,
Oregon, Washington, Idaho and the northern part of Nevada . . . .
"4. Mr. Knemeyer has approved appointment of Mr. Whitney Lyon as distributor for all of the remaining territory not
specifically mentioned in paragraph 3 above.... "
Approximately a year later, after a dispute had arisen
between Thomson and some of its distributors including plaintiffs, Knemeyer returned to California and with Borgward's
approval, terminated Thompson as importer, and appointed
Anthony. At that time Knemeyer met with plaintiffs and
other distributors and according to plaintiffs made the oral
agreement that is the subject of their action against Borgward.
After Anthony informed plaintiffs that their contract would
not be renewed, plaintiffs wrote Borgward and received a
cable in reply stating that the matter was being referred to
Knemeyer, then enroute to the United States and Canada,
who would get in touch with plaintiffs in California. Process
was served on Knemeyer shortly after he arrived in California
on this trip.
Disregarding the numerous affidavits setting forth extrajudicial statements of Knemeyer to California distributors and
dealers that he had full authority to act for Borgward with
respect to the importation, distribution, and sales of its products in California (see Hilyar V. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal.2d 30,
42 [286 P.2d 21]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 5), we
conclude from the foregoing evidence that Knemeyer performed important services for Borgward in California, namely, the establishment and maintenance of a satisfactory importing, distributing, and sales organization. Regardless of
how closely these activities may have been supervised from
Germany, they nevertheless were activities of Borgward
through its agent here, and were sufficient to constitutt'
Knemeyer Borgward's "general manager in this State"
(Corp. Code, § 6500) for purposes of service of process if
Borgward was doing business here. (Chas. Ehrlich &; CO. V. J.
Elli.s Slater Co., 183 Cal. 709, 713 [192 P. 526] ; Eel'ipse Fuel
etc. CO. V. SupcriOl' Court, 148 Ca1.App.2d 736, 743-746 [307
P.2d 739] ; Milbank v. StancWl'd Motor Canst. Co., ]32 Cal.
App. 67, 71 [22 P.2d 271].)

!
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It thus appears that Borgward is not merely a manufac1urrr who ~cJJs its products in Germany knowin,:r 1111'.'- will
rpaeh this siair. It has actively undertaken 10 prolllo!.' and
protect its market in Califoruia by sending Its agcllt to lJegotiate contracts here. It reaps the benefit of the 10.·a1 market
alld has access to our courts to enforce any rights growing
out of its transactions here. Plaintiffs' alleged cause of
action grew directly out of their relationship with Borgward's
agent here and Borgward's dealings with its local importer
Anthony. Plaintiffs are not seeking needlessly to inject Borgward into a controversy concerning only them and Anthony.
If plaintiffs are able to prove the existence of their contract
with Borgward and its breach, they may nevertheless fail to
prove that it is binding on Anthony or to establish any cause
of action against Anthony. Obviously, however, it is preferable, if possible, to settle the entire controversy in one action,
here or in Germany. Even if it is assumed that plaintiffs
could secure jurisdiction over Anthony in a German court,
since all of the relevant events occurred in California the
burden on plaintiffs and Anthony of prosecuting and defending in Germany would far outweigh the burden on Borgward
of defending here.
No point would be served by reiterating here the review of
the recent authorities sustaining jurisdiction over foreign
corporations set forth in the J ahn case. For the reasons
stated above, however, and in the light of those authorities,
we conclude that "the quality and nature of [its] activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws"
fully justifies subjecting Borgward to the jurisdiction of our
courts. (IlIicr'llatiollal Shoe 00. v_ Washingtoll, 326 U.S.
310,319 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057].)
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ
denied.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., C,:,rter, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would grant the writ for the
reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Vallee in the opinion prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal in Borgward v.
S1lperior Court (Ca1.App.), 325 P.2d 137.
Petitioller's applieatioll for a rellt'ariug was denied NoYt'1II1wr 19, 1958. Se1la11er, .J., and M"Comb, J., were of HIe
opinion that the applieatioll should be granted.

